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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 This procedurally-complex case stems from financial 
crimes at a public company, which led to a peculiar confluence 
of events:  criminal convictions of the company’s top 
executive, the executive’s unforeseen death while in custody, 
several class action and derivative lawsuits, a number of 
proposed settlement agreements, ongoing bankruptcy 
proceedings, and numerous disputes spanning across three 
levels of the federal judiciary in three separate jurisdictions.  At 
this point, however, we are faced with a single appeal that 
raises two specific issues—a jurisdictional issue and a merits 
issue.  Here, upon assuring ourselves of our appellate 
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jurisdiction, we will affirm the underlying order for the reasons 
set forth below.   
I. BACKGROUND 
  In the mid-2000s, David Brooks (“Brooks”), Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of SS Body Armor I, Inc. 
(“Debtor”), was charged with a panoply of financial crimes.  In 
response to a slew of class action and derivative lawsuits 
consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York (“EDNY”), Debtor proposed a global 
settlement agreement (“First Settlement Agreement”) worth 
approximately $48 million and that, among other things, 
indemnified Brooks for liability under section 304 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX 304”), 15 U.S.C. § 7243.1   
 D. David Cohen (“Cohen”), former General Counsel 
and a shareholder of Debtor, objected to the First Settlement 
Agreement on the ground that the SOX 304 indemnification 
provision was unlawful.  After the EDNY district court 
overruled his objection and approved the settlement 
agreement, Cohen pursued an appeal to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second Circuit”), 
represented by Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP (“CLM”).  The 
Second Circuit agreed with Cohen, holding that the settlement 
                                              
 1 In pertinent part, SOX 304 authorizes the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to claw back, or recoup, 
performance-based compensation paid to CEOs where 
financial statements must be restated as a result of misconduct.  
Id.  The SEC pursued this liability, allegedly valued at around 
$186 million, in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida (“SDFL”).   
 5 
 
agreement’s indemnification of Brooks violated SOX 304 and 
thus required vacatur of the EDNY district court’s order 
approving of the agreement.  In so doing, the Second Circuit 
noted that the EDNY district court would ultimately have to 
determine the appropriate attorneys’ fees to award CLM.  
 Around the time the Second Circuit upended the First 
Settlement Agreement, Debtor initiated Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware (“Bankruptcy Court”).  With that, the 
Bankruptcy Court effectively took control over the EDNY 
litigation, as any settlement would need to be approved by the 
Bankruptcy Court.  Eventually, the Bankruptcy Court 
confirmed Debtor’s liquidation plan that, among other things, 
established a recovery trustee (“Recovery Trustee”) to pursue 
Debtor’s interest in further recouping its losses from the 
ongoing EDNY and SDFL actions.    
 While the bankruptcy proceedings continued, Brooks 
died in prison.  Because his criminal appeal had not yet 
concluded, some of his convictions and the concomitant 
restitution obligations imposed during the prosecution were 
abated.  In light of this shift in the landscape, various 
stakeholders negotiated another global settlement agreement 
(“Second Settlement Agreement”) to resolve all outstanding 
claims.  Under that agreement, approximately $142 million of 
Brooks’ restrained assets were agreed to be distributed to 
various victims of his financial crimes.  Of that $142 million, 
roughly $70 million has recently been remitted to Debtor.   
 Meanwhile, still seeking its attorneys’ fees for 
preserving the SOX 304 claim nearly a decade prior, CLM 
initiated a series of filings.  First, it filed a fee application in 
the Bankruptcy Court.  In that application, CLM indicated that 
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it billed 1,502.2 hours and incurred fees totaling $549,472.61 
in connection with the SOX 304 claim.  Using a lodestar 
multiplier of 3.38, CLM thus sought an attorneys’ fees award 
of $1.86 million, representing 1% of the potential SOX 304 
liability it had preserved.  In ruling on the fee application, the 
Bankruptcy Court purported to award CLM attorneys’ fees but 
did not quantify the exact amount of the award.  Instead, the 
Bankruptcy Court ruled that the amount of the award would be 
determined in the future, if and when Debtor actually received 
any funds on account of the SOX 304 claim.  The Bankruptcy 
Court’s ruling made clear, however, that CLM would not be 
entitled to any award if Debtor were to never receive any funds 
on account of the SOX 304 claim.  Concerned of the potential 
to receive nothing, CLM appealed the fee application order 
(“Fee Application Appeal”) to the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware (“District Court”).  Fully briefed, 
the Fee Application Appeal remains pending at the District 
Court.    
 CLM next filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court 
requesting that a $25 million reserve be set aside from which 
its attorneys’ fees could be paid.  Without determining the 
exact amount of attorneys’ fees owed to CLM, the Bankruptcy 
Court granted the motion in part, ordering Debtor to set aside 
$5 million from any settlement funds until resolution of CLM’s 
fee application.  Believing $5 million to be insufficient, CLM 
appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s fee reserve order (“Fee 
Reserve Appeal”) to the District Court.  Fully briefed, the Fee 
Reserve Appeal also remains pending at the District Court.  
 In the Bankruptcy Court, CLM then moved for a stay of 
any distributions from the Second Settlement Agreement 
pending its Fee Reserve Appeal.  The Bankruptcy Court denied 
the motion.  CLM subsequently appealed—in a new appeal, 
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not the pending Fee Reserve Appeal—the Bankruptcy Court’s 
stay denial order (“Stay Denial Appeal”) to the District Court.  
In its Stay Denial Appeal, CLM filed an emergency motion 
(“Emergency Stay Motion”) requesting the District Court to 
stay distributions from the Second Settlement Agreement 
pending resolution of the Fee Reserve Appeal, in which it was 
now requesting a $15 million fee reserve.  Debtor and the 
Recovery Trustee (collectively “Appellees”) opposed the 
motion, which the District Court eventually denied.  From that 
denial, CLM now appeals to us.  
 This case thus presents us with two questions.  First, do 
we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal?  Second, if we have 
jurisdiction, did the District Court correctly deny CLM’s 
Emergency Stay Motion?  For the reasons set forth below, we 
answer each question in the affirmative.  
II. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE 
 CLM argues that we have appellate jurisdiction because 
the District Court’s denial of the Emergency Stay Motion 
qualifies as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) or, 
alternatively, as an injunctive order under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1).  We agree on the first ground for jurisdiction and 
thus do not reach the second ground. 
 Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), we have jurisdiction over 
appeals of “all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees” 
entered by a district court reviewing a bankruptcy court’s order 
in an appellate capacity.  For us to have jurisdiction under the 
statute, however, both relevant district court and bankruptcy 
court orders must be final.  See In re White Beauty View, Inc., 
841 F.2d 524, 525–26 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Klaas, 858 F.3d 
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820, 825 (3d Cir. 2017).  We address the finality of each order 
in turn.   
A. Finality of District Court’s Order 
 Since we have no direct precedent on the finality of the 
relevant District Court order, we look chiefly to In re Revel AC, 
Inc., 802 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J.), our most 
factually analogous case.2  There, the bankruptcy court entered 
an order authorizing a debtor to sell its casino property free and 
clear of any tenancies.  See Revel, 802 F.3d at 564.  An 
aggrieved tenant appealed the sale authorization order to the 
district court and moved to stay the sale pending the appeal.  
See id.  After the district court denied a stay, but while the 
underlying appeal was still pending in the district court, the 
tenant appealed the stay denial to us.  See id. at 566.  
Importantly, the sale was scheduled to close imminently and, 
once it did, the tenant’s possessory interest in the property 
would be lost forever given a statute under which reversing a 
sale authorization order does not affect the validity of the sale 
itself.  See id. at 564–65, 567.  Noting that “the upshot of 
declining the [tenant’s] stay request [was] to prevent it from 
obtaining a full airing of its issues on appeal and a decision on 
the merits,” we ruled that the district court’s order was final.  
Id. at 567.  More specifically, we held that “where it is all but 
assured that a statute will render an appeal moot absent a stay, 
                                              
 2 Our decision in In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 18 
F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 1994), is inapposite because that case, unlike 
this case, involved a district court’s grant of a stay request.  Id. 
at 216.  
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a stay denial is appealable under [28 U.S.C.] § 158(d)(1).”  
Revel, 802 F.3d at 567.   
 Here, a statute would not render CLM’s Fee Reserve 
Appeal moot absent a stay.  Accordingly, the instant appeal 
does not fit within the express terms of Revel’s precise holding.  
But this appeal does fit within Revel’s dicta, to which we give 
teeth today.   
 Indeed, denying CLM’s request for a stay of seemingly 
imminent distributions effectively—even though not 
necessarily by statute—moots its pending Fee Reserve Appeal.  
If Debtor is allowed to freely distribute the proceeds from the 
Second Settlement Agreement, the District Court will be 
unable to grant any relief even if it were to ultimately decide 
that the $5 million fee reserve should have been larger.  That is 
because any funds received by Debtor will be distributed under 
the liquidation plan as quickly as possible to thousands of 
creditors, making it nearly impossible for CLM to claw back 
any funds to which it may later be deemed entitled.  See App. 
184–85 (the Bankruptcy Court’s recognizing that “whatever 
[assets] come[] into [Debtor’s] estate will be distributed . . . as 
quickly as possible” and “all the assets [not subject to a 
reserve] will be disbursed [leaving CLM] with no ability to 
receive a [greater] fee because there[ will] be no money left to 
chase”).   
 At oral argument, Debtor’s counsel informed us that 
Debtor has recently received settlement proceeds of $70 
million.  This only heightens our concern that distributions 
from the Second Settlement Agreement may be made 
imminently.  If these settlement proceeds are distributed before 
resolution of CLM’s Fee Reserve Appeal, that appeal is “all 
but assured” to become moot.  Revel, 802 F.3d at 567.   
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 Thus, because “the upshot of declining [CLM’s] stay 
request is to prevent it from obtaining a full airing of its issues 
on appeal and a decision on the merits,” we deem the District 
Court’s stay denial order final under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).  
Revel, 802 F.3d at 567.  Especially in this bankruptcy 
context—where we have adopted a relaxed, pragmatic, and 
functional view of finality in lieu of the traditional, technical 
view, see In re Comer, 716 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1983)3—we 
do not hesitate in reaching this decision, a mere logical 
application of Revel.   
B. Finality of Bankruptcy Court’s Order 
 We take this same pragmatic approach in assessing the 
finality of the relevant Bankruptcy Court order.  As noted 
previously, the present appeal involves the District Court’s 
ruling on CLM’s Emergency Stay Motion, which was filed in 
the first instance in the District Court.  As a technical matter, 
therefore, there is no underlying Bankruptcy Court order for us 
to review for finality, seemingly precluding jurisdiction.  See 
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(“[S]ection 158(d) is not an available predicate for 
                                              
 3 “We interpret finality pragmatically in bankruptcy 
cases because these proceedings often are protracted and 
involve numerous parties with different claims.  To delay 
resolution of discrete claims until after final approval of a 
reorganization plan, for example, would waste time and 
resources, particularly if the appeal resulted in reversal of a 
bankruptcy court order necessitating re-appraisal of the entire 
plan.”  White Beauty View, 841 F.2d at 526 (citations omitted).   
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jurisdiction” where “the original order appealed from was 
entered by the district court.” (citation omitted)).    
 But the Emergency Stay Motion was filed within the 
broader context of CLM’s Stay Denial Appeal, which formally 
appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s stay denial order.  In ruling 
on the Emergency Stay Motion, the District Court was hence 
functionally reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s stay denial 
order.  The District Court’s own stay denial order evinces that 
it viewed itself as sitting in an appellate capacity.  See App. 27 
(the District Court’s stating that one of the determinations in 
the Bankruptcy Court’s stay denial order did not constitute “an 
abuse of discretion”); see also Appellees’ Br. 38 (seemingly 
conceding that the District Court sat in an appellate capacity 
by referencing its “correctly review[ing]” a finding of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s stay denial order).  CLM’s filing of the 
Emergency Stay Motion thus did no more than hurry the 
District Court’s resolution of the broader Stay Denial Appeal.  
That the District Court technically ruled on that motion instead 
of the appeal in which it was filed does not give us pause 
where, as here, we are to take a relaxed, pragmatic view of 
finality.  See Comer, 716 F.2d at 171.4 
 Satisfied that the District Court was effectively 
reviewing an order of the Bankruptcy Court, we now evaluate 
whether the underlying Bankruptcy Court order was final.  
Like the District Court’s stay denial order, the Bankruptcy 
Court’s stay denial order “all but assured” that CLM’s Fee 
                                              
 4 Nicolet is inapplicable to this analysis because that 
case involved an order issued by a district court exercising its 
original jurisdiction, not—as in this case—in an appellate role 
reviewing a bankruptcy court’s ruling.  857 F.2d at 203–04.    
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Reserve Appeal would become moot since it opened the door 
to immediate settlement distributions, which would preclude 
CLM “from obtaining a full airing of its issues on appeal.”  
Revel, 802 F.3d at 567.  Thus, for the same reasons that the 
District Court’s order was final, so too was the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order.    
* * * 
 In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold that we have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).  
Therefore, we need not—and do not—assess whether we also 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  Having 
assured ourselves of our appellate jurisdiction, we next turn to 
the merits issue in this case. 
III. MERITS ISSUE 
 On the merits, CLM asserts that the District Court 
blundered in denying its Emergency Stay Motion, which 
sought to stay distributions from the Second Settlement 
Agreement pending resolution of the Fee Reserve Appeal.  On 
this issue, we first review the law relevant to stay motions, then 
clarify the applicable standard of review, and finally apply the 
law to the facts using the appropriate standard.  In so doing, we 
determine that the District Court properly denied the 
Emergency Stay Motion.      
A. Relevant Law 
 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allow a 
party to move to stay the effect of a bankruptcy court order 
pending a resolution on appeal.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007.  In 
ruling on such motions, courts assess four factors, similar to 
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those considered in ruling on applications for preliminary 
injunctions:      
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong 
showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the 
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether 
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the 
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) 
where the public interest lies. 
 
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (citations 
omitted).  “In order not to ignore the many gray shadings stay 
requests present, courts ‘balance[] them all’ and ‘consider the 
relative strength of the four factors.’”  Revel, 802 F.3d at 568 
(citations omitted).   
 The Supreme Court has indicated that the first two 
factors are “the most critical,” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 
434 (2009):  whether the stay movant has demonstrated (1) a 
strong showing of the likelihood of success and (2) that it will 
suffer irreparable harm, or “harm that cannot be prevented or 
fully rectified by a successful appeal,” Revel, 802 F.3d at 568 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  We have noted 
that, among these two factors, “the former is arguably the more 
important piece of the stay analysis.”  Id. 
 As to the first factor, a strong showing of the likelihood 
of success exists if there is “a reasonable chance, or probability, 
of winning.”  Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 
F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  “While it is not enough 
that the chance of success on the merits be better than 
negligible, . . . the likelihood of winning on appeal need not be 
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more likely than not.”  Revel, 802 F.3d at 569 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 To satisfy the second factor, the movant must 
demonstrate that irreparable injury is “likely [not merely 
possible]” in the absence of a stay.  Id. (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted).  We understand “likely” to mean “more apt 
to occur than not.”  Id. (citation omitted).     
 Upon satisfaction of the first two factors, courts assess 
the harm to the opposing parties and weigh the public interest.  
Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.  In particular, courts balance the harms 
by weighing the likely harm to the movant absent a stay, the 
second factor, against the likely harm to stay opponents if the 
stay is granted, the third factor.  Revel, 802 F.3d at 569.  Courts 
also evaluate where the public interest lies, the fourth factor, 
which calls for gauging “consequences beyond the immediate 
parties.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 In Revel, we embraced a “sliding-scale” approach to 
determining how strong a case a stay movant must show.  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Under this sliding scale, in essence, “[t]he 
more likely the [movant] is to win, the less heavily need the 
balance of harms weigh in [its] favor;  the less likely [it] is to 
win, the more [heavily] need [the balance of harms] weigh in 
[its] favor.”  Id. (first, third, fourth, and seventh alterations in 
original) (citation omitted).      
 Overall, then, all four stay factors are interconnected 
and the analysis proceeds as follows: 
Did the applicant make a sufficient showing that 
[(1)] it can win on the merits[—]significantly 
better than negligible but not greater than 
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50%[—]and [(2)] will suffer irreparable harm 
absent a stay?  If it has, we “balance the relative 
harms considering all four factors using a 
‘sliding[-]scale’ approach.  However, if the 
movant does not make the requisite showings on 
either of these [first] two factors, the[] inquiry 
into the balance of harms [and the public interest] 
is unnecessary, and the stay should be denied 
without further analysis.” 
Id. at 571 (last three alterations in original) (citation omitted).   
B. Standard of Review 
 We typically review appeals from the denial of a stay 
for abuse of discretion, giving proper regard to the district 
court’s feel of the case.  Id. at 567.  But, since the first factor 
involves a purely legal determination, we review a district 
court’s decision on the likelihood of success de novo.  Id.   
C. Analysis 
 Here, CLM falters at the very first stay factor.  
Reviewing the factor de novo, we determine that CLM has a 
fatally low likelihood of succeeding in its Fee Reserve Appeal.  
This compels us to affirm the District Court’s underlying order, 
even without considering any of the remaining stay factors. 
 The first stay factor requires us to evaluate whether 
CLM has shown that it has a “significantly better than 
negligible” chance of succeeding on the merits of its pending 
Fee Reserve Appeal.  Id. at 571.  At its core, that appeal asks 
whether $5 million is an adequate amount to cover the 
attorneys’ fees CLM accrued in connection with its 
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preservation of the SOX 304 claim.  Answering that 
overarching question calls for us to consider—though not 
conclusively decide—a subsidiary question:  what is the 
appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees that CLM should be 
awarded?  We ruminate on that analysis here. 
 First, we must assess the appropriate method for 
calculating attorneys’ fees at this procedural juncture.  There 
are two such methods used by federal courts—the lodestar 
approach and the percentage-of-recovery approach.  See In re 
Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 732 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Generally, the lodestar method is used in statutory fee-
shifting cases while the percentage-of-recovery method is 
favored in cases involving a common fund.  See id.  
 The lodestar method is the simpler of the two.  Under 
that approach, “court[s] determine[] an attorney’s lodestar 
award by multiplying the number of hours he or she reasonably 
worked on a client’s case by a reasonable hourly billing rate 
for such services given the geographical area, the nature of the 
services provided, and the experience of the lawyer.”  Gunter 
v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 195 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citations omitted).  Although the lodestar method 
“yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient,” courts may, in 
“rare and exceptional circumstances,” use a multiplier to adjust 
the fee award upward or downward.  Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. 
Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); see Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1.    
 The percentage-of-recovery method is more complex.  
Generally used in common fund cases—where a litigant 
creates, discovers, increases, or preserves a fund for the benefit 
of a group, see Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 
(1970)—this method “is designed to allow courts to award fees 
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from the fund in a manner that rewards counsel for success and 
penalizes it for failure.”  Cendant, 243 F.3d at 732 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  When analyzing a fee 
award under this method, courts may consider, among others, 
seven factors:   
(1) the size of the fund created and the number of 
persons benefitted; (2) the presence or absence 
of substantial objections by members of the class 
to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by 
counsel; (3) the skill and efficiency of the 
attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and 
duration of the litigation; (5) the risk of 
nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to 
the case by counsel; and (7) the awards in similar 
cases. 
 In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 
2005) (Scirica, J.) (citations omitted); see In re AT & T Corp., 
455 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2006) (Scirica, J.) (“In reviewing 
an attorneys’ fees award in a class action settlement, a district 
court should consider the Gunter factors, the [In re Prudential 
Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283 
(3d Cir. 1998) (Scirica, J.)] factors, and any other factors that 
are useful and relevant with respect to the particular facts of 
the case.”).  Upon doing so, a cross-check using the lodestar 
method is appropriate.  See Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 305.  This 
lodestar cross-check calculation, however, “need entail neither 
mathematical precision nor bean-counting.”  Id. at 306. 
 Although the percentage-of-recovery method is often 
used in common fund cases, courts may apply the lodestar 
method where “the nature of the settlement evades the precise 
evaluation needed for the percentage[-]of[-]recovery method.”  
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In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995); see also id. at 821 
(stating that a court “may select the lodestar method in some 
non-statutory fee cases where it can calculate the relevant 
parameters (hours expended and hourly rate) more easily than 
it can determine a suitable percentage to award”); Rite Aid, 396 
F.3d at 300 (explaining that the lodestar method is typically 
applied “where the nature of the recovery does not allow the 
determination of the settlement’s value required for application 
of the percentage-of-recovery method” (citation omitted)).   
 Such is this case.  At this particular procedural moment, 
where the record is unclear as to what portion of the settlement 
proceeds is attributable to the preserved SOX 304 claim, we 
opt to employ the lodestar method.5  At this stay stage, we need 
only decide whether CLM has demonstrated a sufficient 
likelihood of success on the merits.  The lodestar method 
allows us to determine this more straightforwardly.6   
                                              
 5 We leave it to the discretion of the Bankruptcy Court 
or District Court whether to apply the lodestar method or 
percentage-of-recovery method in later stages of this litigation, 
such as in eventually quantifying CLM’s fee application or 
ruling on its Fee Application Appeal or Fee Reserve Appeal. 
 6 If the Bankruptcy Court or District Court chooses to 
later employ the percentage-of-recovery method, we also leave 
it to it to decide in the first instance several lingering issues 
related to that method, such as whether the settlement proceeds 
constitute a common fund from which CLM is entitled to 
attorneys’ fees, what quantity of proceeds to consider, and how 
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 Second, we must now apply our chosen lodestar 
method.  But, to be clear, we do not need to determine at this 
point the exact amount of attorneys’ fees CLM is due.  Rather, 
we must simply decide whether, as both the Bankruptcy Court 
and District Court concluded, $5 million is an adequate amount 
to cover the attorneys’ fees CLM incurred in preserving the 
SOX 304 claim.  See App. 401 (the Bankruptcy Court’s stating 
that “there[ is] a very low likelihood of [CLM’s] receiving a 
fee award in excess of $5 million”); id. at 27 (the District 
Court’s stating that it “cannot find that . . . a [$5 million] 
reserve constitutes an abuse of discretion”).  
 Here, we conclude that the $5 million reserve is 
sufficient.  A $5 million attorneys’ fees award for 1,502.2 
hours of legal work totaling $549,472.61 of documented fees 
would yield an hourly rate of $3,328.45 and a lodestar 
multiplier of over nine.  But we have previously noted that, in 
common fund cases where attorneys’ fees are calculated using 
the lodestar method, “[m]ultiples ranging from one to four” are 
the norm.  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 341 (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted); see also Cendant, 243 F.3d at 737–42 & 
n.22 (collecting a cornucopia of complex and lengthy cases in 
which highly skilled attorneys spent significant time and effort 
to establish large common funds, only one of which awarded 
attorneys’ fees using a lodestar multiplier higher than three).  
At this stage, we see no reason to stray from that range.  
 To be sure, CLM showed tremendous skill and 
expended substantial time in preserving a highly valuable 
claim.  But its attempts to argue that it is somehow due 
                                              
much of the proceeds are on account of CLM’s preservation of 
the SOX 304 claim.  
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attorneys’ fees more than $5 million are belied by its initial fee 
application in the Bankruptcy Court.  There, CLM sought 
attorneys’ fees totaling $1.86 million using a lodestar 
multiplier of 3.38, which it stated was “entirely reasonable in 
light of . . . the value of the asset preserved and benefits 
conferred, the risks undertaken by counsel[,] and the public 
policies that were vindicated” by preserving the SOX 304 
claim.  CLM’s Fee Appl. 35, ECF No. 3300 in In re S.S. Body 
Armor I, Inc., Case No. 10-11255 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Sep. 
25, 2015); see id. (citing with approval Prudential and Cendant 
for the proposition that multipliers up to four are normally 
awarded in common fund cases).  We see no reason why 
CLM’s prior analysis should not hold now, especially given the 
current record.7            
                                              
 7 Although CLM earlier sought a $25 million reserve at 
the Bankruptcy Court, it now suggests that it is entitled to 
attorneys’ fees ranging between $10 million and $40 million.  
Although these figures have some purported, arithmetical 
justification, they are untethered from reality.  See Appellant’s 
Br. 47 (calculating $40 million in attorneys’ fees by arguing 
that, since the Second Settlement Agreement—which includes 
the SOX 304 claim—is worth $142 million and the First 
Settlement Agreement—which did not include the SOX 304 
claim—was worth $48 million, CLM conferred a benefit equal 
to 295% of the First Settlement Agreement and thus should 
receive attorneys’ fees equal to 295% of the $13.5 million 
already awarded to class counsel).  These mathematical 
machinations are unavailing here, where CLM has itself 
conceded that attorneys’ fees well below $5 million are 
“entirely reasonable.”  CLM’s Fee Appl. 35, ECF No. 3300 in 
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 Because exceeding a $5 million reserve would demand 
a lodestar multiplier greater than nine—more than double the 
top end of the typical range for multipliers in cases like this 
one—we are confident that a $5 million reserve is sufficient to 
award CLM the attorneys’ fees it is due for preserving the SOX 
304 claim.  Put another way, at this stage of this litigation, 
CLM has not carried its burden of demonstrating that it has a 
“significantly better than negligible” chance of succeeding on 
the merits of its pending Fee Reserve Appeal.  Revel, 802 F.3d 
at 571.       
 Deciding this first stay factor against CLM is, on its 
own, fatal to the instant appeal.  See id. (“[I]f the movant does 
not make the requisite showings on either of these [first] two 
factors, . . . the stay should be denied without further analysis.” 
(second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted)).  Accordingly, we need not—and do not—assess any 
of the remaining factors.  In sum, the District Court correctly 
denied CLM’s Emergency Stay Motion.      
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we are assured of our 
appellate jurisdiction and will affirm the District Court’s order 
denying CLM’s Emergency Stay Motion.  
                                              
In re S.S. Body Armor I, Inc., Case No. 10-11255 (Bankr. D. 
Del. filed Sep. 25, 2015). 
